This paper tests for the existence of two types of selection biases in sports markets. First, the better educated players and players of higher socioeconomic background have better outside opportunities. If they decide to follow a professional soccer career they must be truly good in order to compensate their higher opportunity costs. Second, if innate athletic talent is distributed equally among the population, we should not find any difference in the performance evaluation of white and nonwhite players. This potential difference provides a "market test" for discrimination. Using data on the Uruguayan Soccer League in the 2000 and 2001 seasons we find evidence of these two types of selection biases. Our estimations show a positive relationship between education and performance, education and promotions, socioeconomic background and performance, socioeconomic background and promotions and discrimination against nonwhite players in the national league but not with respect to international soccer markets.
Introduction
Whoever chooses to become a professional athlete must be compensated for his outside opportunities. Better-educated players and players of higher socioeconomic background have better outside opportunities. On the contrary, racial discrimination in the labor markets suggests that nonwhite individuals have lower outside opportunities. Even in the absence of "true" effects of education, socioeconomic background or race in sports performance, there is a self-selection process inducing less educated players, lower socioeconomic background and nonwhite players likely to be interested in sports as a career option. This self-selection implies that individuals with more education and coming from a higher socioeconomic background that follow a career in professional sports are on average better players than those with less education and from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. We should expect the opposite for nonwhites.
In this paper, we stress two types of biases in professional sports. One of these biases is a natural extension -not made before-of higher opportunity costs of some individuals and the other is a somewhat different perspective on the issue of racial discrimination.
First, although there may be some minor "true" effects of education and socioeconomic background on performance (e.g. better understanding of rules or better nourishing), the nature of soccer is such that physical ability is the main issue. Therefore, a positive relationship between education and socioeconomic background with performance and the probability of being transferred is probably the result of the said self-selection process. Better-educated players and players of higher socioeconomic background if they choose to play soccer as a profession must expect to be compensated for their higher outside opportunities. Given the high risks involved in becoming a successful player those well-educated players of higher social background should only choose to become professional players if they are truly outstanding.
Second, we investigate the meaning of a correlation between nonwhite players and performance. If a positive correlation exists, this means that -all else equal-the typical black player is better evaluated by field experts (e.g. sports journalists) than the typical white player. How can this be so? Why are there no mediocre black players? If we believe the distribution of innate athletic talent within each population is similar, there must be some kind of selection bias, which prevents mediocre black players from obtaining jobs while mediocre white players do. Therefore, performance evaluation of players can be used to construct a "market test" for discrimination.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical analysis that finds a positive relationship between education and players' performance. The selection bias interpretation for the sports market is one example of how occupational choice is endogenous to workers' attributes. This calls for a word of caution when interpreting the effect on workers of "exogenous" determinants. We also find that nonwhite players are better evaluated than white players but that race is not a significant determinant of international transfers. These results are evidence of racial discrimination against nonwhite players in the national league but not with respect to international promotions.
As we will explain latter our discrimination evidence should be understand in relative not in absolute terms. We found that in the soccer market in Uruguay there is more racial discrimination compared to the general national labor market.
The next section summarizes the relevant literature. Section three presents a simple framework to help interpret the results of the empirical section. Section four presents the data sources and estimation strategy. Section five presents the results and finally section six concludes.
Brief literature review
Since Rottemberg (1956) sports labor markets have been an area of intense research.
Besides the intrinsic interests in sports per se, the professional sports labor market gives an outstanding opportunity for applied economics research. As stated in Kahn's (2000) literature review (page 75) "there is no research setting other than sports where we know the name, face, and life history of every production worker and supervisor in the industry".
The study of discrimination in labor markets has motivated a large literature reviewed in Cain (1986) and Altonji and Blank (1999) .
1 Evidence of race differentials in the labor markets has been found persistently. In the sports economics literature, Bellmore (2001) -studying the determinants of promotion and relegation in the American Baseball Major
Leagues-finds evidence of racial discrimination against Blacks and Hispanics in the form of lower probabilities of being promoted from the minor to the major leagues.
There are several previous studies that find discrimination in baseball and basketball like Brown, Spiro and Keenan (1991) , Jiobu (1988) , Johnson and Marple (1973) and Kahn and Sherer (1988) . Szymanski (2000) uses a racial discrimination market test approach (similar in spirit to the one used in this paper) using data of team performance.
For a survey of discrimination in professional sports see Kahn (1991) .
Following Goode (1959) human capital 2 is composed of the knowledge, skills, aptitudes and other acquired traits that contribute to production. The accumulation of human capital takes places in three ways: formal schooling, on-the-job training and off-the-job training. Clearly, training is the most important channel of human capital accumulation in sports. Training refers to the physical and tactical aspects of the sport, players' fitness and technical skills. Schooling on the contrary refers to academic learning that has not a direct impact on sports performance but will enrich individuals labor opportunities in a broader sense. The investment in human capital is costly. In his original model Becker (1964) differentiates between general and specific human capital. General human capital is not only useful to the current employer but also to other potential employers.
Specific human capital has an enhancing effect in the current employer but is of no value for other employers. The prediction of the Becker model is that firms will be willing to invest in human capital specific knowledge but not in general human capital.
According to Becker's model prediction club managers are not likely to invest in formal schooling.
Since Mincer's (1974) seminal paper the returns to human capital investments in general and education in particular have received a lot of attention from labor economic researchers. The basic methodology consists of regressing income on education, training and other controls. Most studies find a positive and significant association 1 The latter includes a brief summary of discrimination in sports economics. 2 For an in depth review of the theory of human capital see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) .
between education and income. According to Wilson (2001) in developed western economies the average estimate of the return to an additional year of education ranges from 5% to 10%. On the contrary, in professional sports Barros (2001) finds no evidence of such a relationship between education and income in soccer players in the Portuguese National League. In a closely related issue, Shmanske (1992) studies the formation of human capital in Golf. Leeds (2003) is closely related to our work in the sense that he combines human capital, race and sports as in the current paper. Leeds (2003) presents a model with three markets: the sports market, the professional market and the unskilled market.
Individuals invest in athletic or professional human capital according to their expected income net of human capital investment costs. Leeds stress that the relatively early opening of the athletic market to blacks in the US may induce a disproportionate investment in athletic skills. This results in the overrepresentation of blacks in sports markets and in unskilled jobs (for those that failed in the sport market and do not have the human capital needed for skilled jobs) and the under representation in professional markets. Leeds, Miller, and Stull (2007) do not find supporting evidence for the distortion of human capital decisions of black participating in interscholastic athletics.
Besides these papers the issue of education and human capital have not been studied in applied research to professional sports labor markets.
A simple framework
For simplicity lets assume that, as with most physical attributes, athletic endowed talent is most likely distributed uniformly in the population. 3 As in Leeds (2003) we assume that any individual can acquire the skills needed to enter the sports market but the cost of investment in the human capital specific for sports market is a decreasing function of the endowed athletic talent. That is to say that individuals with more innate athletic talent will find it less costly to engage in on-the-job training (e.g. the junior divisions) or off-the-job training (e.g. individual training). Athletic talent has no effect on the cost of investing in formal schooling. Therefore all other things equal we should expect that the larger the innate athletic talent, the larger the investment in sports specific human capital but no effect on general human capital. where X represents all other factors. P(·,X) is an increasing function of e both due to the direct effect of the innate athletic talent on performance but also due to an indirect effect through sports specific human capital. Without getting into the market structure of labor bargaining we will simply assume that player's income (i) is an increasing function of his performance which is itself a function of talent and other factors. Specifically, we allow for potential racial discrimination in the soccer market. Therefore we have
An individual will prefer to become a professional player if his expected income is higher than that of outside opportunities. We assume that outside opportunities are an increasing function of individuals investment in general human capital (e.g. formal education) and the socioeconomic background but it is not affected by sports specific human capital (sports training). The outside opportunity may also be subject to racial These two implications mean that in order to find it profitable to become professional players, more educated players or players of higher socioeconomic background, the more sports-talented they needs to be.
c. In the absence of discrimination in the sports market and in the general market, the cutoff talent level should be equal for white and nonwhite players. Moreover if discrimination in sports markets were no different than that of other markets, discrimination in this market would be undetectable in the present framework. But if discrimination affects sports markets more than the outside opportunities of nonwhite players the cut-off level will be higher for them, i.e. ) ( ) ( * * nonwhites e whites e < .
In our simple framework we compare expected soccer income versus outside opportunities. Although the framework ignores several issues, it is able to illuminate on the potential biases present in soccer markets due to education and racial discrimination effects. One important element that is not incorporated is that one might expect the variance in future wages in sport careers to be higher than in other jobs. The issue of variation is even more important if one realizes that selection into a soccer career is occurring with only partial knowledge about one's long-term soccer potential in national or international play. Particularly, for more educated workers, this issue of variance should affect negatively their evaluation of a soccer career. Therefore, although we acknowledge the importance of risk assessment with respect to career options, in the case of this paper adding such element will complicate the analysis and would only strengthen the results that are already present in the above simpler framework.
Summing up, this simple framework implies that the performance and the probability of success will be higher for better-educated players and players of higher socioeconomic background "that rationally choose to pursue a career in sports". In the presence of local racial discrimination nonwhite players will have better performances and in the presence of discrimination in the international markets nonwhite players will have higher probabilities of being transferred.
Data and methodology

Uruguayan soccer
Uruguayan soccer has a very rich history that includes wining two 
Data sources and definition of variables
Dependent variables
The theoretical motivation of this paper suggested that players' outside opportunity influence the decision to pursue a professional career in soccer. To test this hypothesis we use two approximations to measure players' quality.
First, we construct a direct measure of players quality using 572 journalist evaluations.
After each game it is customary in the popular press to evaluate each player's performance individually. We use the average of these journalist evaluations as our proxy for performance.
The main advantage of using journalist evaluations is that they provide a global, common range measure of performance that accounts for all different aspects of the game. The journalist evaluation is not subject to the biases of other performance measures that are affected by players' position in the field (e.g. goals). The main shortcoming of the journalism measure is that it is not objective. Writer-bias may operate here. For instance, some journalists may harbor subtle prejudice against nonwhite players with the consequence that nonwhite players may be evaluated less favorably than white players. 4 Also there may be team affiliation issues. A journalist's team sympathies may translate into their professional assessment of player performance;
it is possible that players of certain teams systematically receive better or worse evaluations than deserved. In order to minimize these issues the database was constructed using the sports section of one of the most respected national newspapers Second, we use the promotions to foreign leagues as a signaling variable of players' quality. Given the salary and benefit differentials, success for an Uruguayan player is associated with being transferred to one of these foreign leagues. In this paper a player is considered to be professionally successful if he is transferred to a foreign league were wages and bonuses are substantially higher than in the Uruguayan League. 5 Transfer is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the player was transferred to an international league and 0 otherwise.
These transfers can be permanent or transitory. The foreign team can buy the right to enroll the player in its team and to sell it in the future, or it can agree to enroll the player for a specified amount of time after which, the rights over the player's enrollment return 
Explanatory variables
We have other partial measures of performance: a positive one is the number of goals scored and a negative one refers to the sanctions the player received. When a player commits a foul (or other "misconduct") he may receive a yellow card. After two yellow cards in the same game, he is shown the red card and has to leave the field leaving his team with one player less. If the foul committed is very severe the referee can show the red card without the yellow card warning. We construct a weighted sum of sanctions for each player (one red card equals two yellow cards). In order to be consistent, we only consider goals scored and the cards received for the games in which we had a journalist evaluation. Therefore we can construct average per appearance variables (Goals=goals per appearance and Cards=cards per appearance). The problem of these performance measures -and that is why we say they are partial measures of performance-is that they vary with the position in the field, e.g. attack players are more likely to score more goals and receive less cards than defense players.
We complemented our data set with a brief survey of the Board 
Estimation strategy
This section presents the issues involved in estimating the effects of our variables of interest (education, socioeconomic background and race) in players' performance and in the probability of obtaining an international transfer.
In the performance model the independent variables are: age, a dummy variable to indicate if the player was formed in the junior divisions of the same team he is currently playing, race, education and socioeconomic environment. For education we explored two alternatives. First we use two dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the player attained the first level of high school education and another dummy taking the value of 1 if the player was enrolled in a higher level and 0 otherwise. Second, we used the number of years of formal education completed. We control for several variables that may be associated with performance as: the average amount of goals scored per appearance and the average amount of penalty cards (red and yellow) received per appearance, the position in the field and team effects.
The basic model to be estimated is: is an indicator function taking the value of one when
There is a potential endogeneity problem for education if schooling is a complement to the development of sporting abilities. For instance in football and basketball in the US the top junior leagues are organized and managed under the auspice of academic institutions. On the other hand, schooling might be a substitute to the development of sporting abilities as in the case of hockey in Canada. In this case, a very talented youngster might choose not to go to school in order to practice more effectively the sport. The typical econometric solution to this problem is the use of instrumental variables. Socioeconomic background is a natural instrument for education.
Using players' socioeconomic background to instrument for education we will estimate the following two specifications: The determinants of international transfers have to be estimated with qualitative models (Transfer is a binary variable) where the treatment of endogenous variables is a bit more sophisticated than in linear models. Newey (1987) discuss the estimation of limited simultaneous equations systems with one structural equation that has a limited dependent variable. It shows that a two-stage Amemiya GLS estimator is asymptotically efficient and simple to compute. This technique is an extension of the two stage least squares procedure implied by the IV estimation of linear models. To control for endogeneity in education we implement Newey (1987) methodology for the determinants of international transfers.
Results
Descriptive results
In total, in the 2000 and 2001 seasons there were 632 players that played at least 2 games. Of these players, 559 are Uruguayans. Table 1 The Temporary and Permanent columns do no sum up to the total transfers column because during the period of analysis some players were initially temporary transferred and latter permanently transferred.
Disaggregating the analysis of transfers according to race does not seem to show any conclusive pattern. There is a slightly higher percentage of nonwhite players that were not transferred. On the other hand, the percentage of permanent transfers is monotonically increasing with the education level. The percentages of temporary and permanent transfers are also positively correlated with the socioeconomic background of the players. educational level attained than the actual years of schooling it is useful to keep in mind the relationship between these two proxies of education. Players who only attained primary school, on average studied six years (finished primary school). Those players whose maximum level was high school (first level) on average studied three more years and those that continued over have on average a bit above twelve years (finishing high school but not even completing the first year towards a university degree). According to the years of formal schooling white players are more educated than nonwhite players.
The mean of the average performance evaluation is 4.8. There is no difference in the average performance of white and nonwhite players but this does not account for the possible joint effects with other variables. For instance since nonwhite players are less educated they should have lower outside opportunities and therefore there should be some not so talented nonwhite players that choose to become professional soccer players. The econometric strategy accounts for these types of joint effects.
As is natural to expect, the higher the socioeconomic background the higher the investment in education but even the average level of those players with a higher socioeconomic background is only eleven years (high school dropouts). On average a player studies eight years (primary school plus two more).
Players of higher socioeconomic environment are on average two and a half years older than those with low socioeconomic background and more than one year older than those with a medium socioeconomic background. This suggests that the socioeconomic environment is associated with some factors that help to maintain competitive-level physical shape. Alternatively, this can also be the result of the self-selection process by which only those truly good players of higher socioeconomic backgrounds get into professional soccer. Table 3 disaggregates the analysis according to the promotion success of players. As expected, the average performance of a player seems to be correlated with the probabilities of obtaining a promotion to a foreign league. Those players that were not transferred had average evaluations below those who had temporary transfers. Those with temporary transfers had lower evaluations than those with permanent transfers.
The average players' age is twenty-five. Those that had a temporary transfer are older than those that were not transferred and more than one year younger on average than those with a permanent transfer. Age can be interpreted as a proxy of experience and in this line higher experience seems to improve the probability of success in being promoted to a foreign league.
International exposure through the national team is also associated with higher probabilities of being transferred. Of those not transferred, 24% played for the national team, of those that obtained a temporary transfer 33% played for the national team and finally, of those with a permanent transfer 41% played for the national team.
With respect to the training and formation of players, about half of each team was formed in their team's junior divisions. It is striking that of those with a permanent transfer only 26% were playing in their original team. Attack players probably face higher probabilities of being transferred since the goals per appearance is more than the double for transferred players relative to non-transferred players. Finally, there is no significant difference in the years of education or in the racial composition of transferred and non-transferred players. Table 4 presents the results of the performance regressions. The dependent variable is the average player evaluation. In column A we present the basic framework (equation 1) where we only include age, a dummy for junior divisions, the per appearance average of goals, punishment cards and race. We control for the position in the field and for team effects (not reported). Standard errors control for potential heteroscedasticity problems.
Econometric results
Performance
In columns B through E we explore the effects of adding education (columns B and C refer to equation 2 and columns D and E refer to equation 3). Finally, column F includes the effects of the socioeconomic environment (equation 4).
Education, socioeconomic background and race Columns B through E in Table 4 report a very consistent view of the effects of education both in the OLS and in the IV estimates (we also report Hausman tests that
show that the sets of instruments were adequate). Considering a larger sample but a cruder measure of education we found that attaining high school (first level) improves a player's performance compared to those players that were only enrolled in primary school. This effect is somewhat lower (but still significant) for players that achieved higher levels of formal education. This suggests the presence of non-linearities.
The second approximation to the effect of education uses the number of years of formal education approved. From equation (3) . The "optimal" amount of schooling according to our estimates is ten years (9.8 according to the OLS estimation and 10.5 according to the IV estimation). This corresponds to the six years of primary school and the first four of high school. Extra schooling after this point has negative marginal performance returns. In this sense, schooling and the developing of sporting abilities are to be considered substitutes. Better-educated players have better outside opportunities and if they choose to pursue a soccer career it must be that they are really good players. Therefore our results with respect to education are pointing towards a self-selection bias in better-educated people with respect to becoming professional soccer players.
In columns B to E the coefficient of race ranges from 0.14 to 0.21. Given an average player evaluation of 4.8, nonwhite players have between 3% to 4% better performance than white players. This market test provides evidence of more racial discrimination in the local sports market in relation to the labor market in general. At least, there are some "mediocre" nonwhite players are not able to obtain contracts to play soccer professionally that similar "mediocre" white players get.
According to column F players of medium socioeconomic background are better evaluated that players of low socioeconomic background. Given the correlation between education and socioeconomic level it is possible that the effects of education on performance produce this last result.
Other controls
The variable Junior Divisions is also statistically significant. Playing in the same team in which a player was formed in the junior divisions improves his performance a minimum of 5% (according to column D) and up to 15% (columns A, B and F). There are several reasons why a player formed in the Junior Divisions may perform better than other players. These reasons may rely on psychological aspects of a player behavior.
Probably the player is not only a worker of the club but also he is a fan of it or at least 20 he has a strong feeling for the club where he is playing. Thus, he may be willing to spend a higher effort. It is also often the case that clubs have a certain "philosophy" of the game (more defensive teams, more attack oriented, etc.). Therefore players that come from these junior divisions know other teammates and the way the team plays better.
Since the ultimate objective of soccer is to score more goals than the rival team, it is not surprising that players that score more goals are better evaluated. What is more surprising is that the sanctions imposed to players in the form of yellow and red cards have no statistically significant effect on the players' evaluations. Besides the weighted sum of cards we experimented with yellow and red cards separately but were not able to find any significantly robust result. Junior Divisions is a dummy that values 1 if the player was formed in the junior divisions of the team were he is currently playing. Goals is the average scored goals per appearance. Cards is the average weighted sum of red and yellow cards (1 red = 2 yellows) received to the number of appearances. Position=Defense, Position=Midfield and Position=Attack are dummies taking the value of 1 whether the player is a defense, midfield or attack player. Educ=2 and Educ=3 takes the value of 1 if the player was enrolled in the first level of high school or if he attained higher levels respectively. Years of schooling measures education directly as the total years in formal schooling. Race values 1 if the player is nonwhite and finally Socioec=Medium and Socioec=High take the value of 1 if the player comes from a medium or high socioeconomic environment.
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 5 reports the results for the estimation of the determinants of professional success.
Professional success (probability of being transferred)
In column A we report the Probit estimation of the basic model in which besides age, junior divisions, goals, cards, race and position in the field we include National Team to capture the effects of international exposure. Columns B, C and D explore the effects of education and socioeconomic background. Standard errors control for potential heteroscedasticity problems.
Education, socioeconomic background and race
The coefficient on race is not significant in any regression. In Table 4 we interpreted the positive coefficient of race as evidence of racial discrimination. This discrimination implies that only good nonwhite players are able to make it into professional soccer.
After controlling for the determinants of performance we find no significant differences for white and nonwhite players in obtaining a transfer to international leagues.
Discrimination therefore is not an issue in the international markets, rather in the formative phases of Uruguayan soccer (before players become professionals).
Column C reports the coefficient and marginal effects for the model extended to include the effects of education on the probability of being transferred. In order to control for potential endogeneity problems we instrument the education level using the socioeconomic level and mean and standard deviation of players' performance (that are correlated with education according to the results of the previous section). The set of instruments was adequate according to a Hausman test also reported in Tables 5. We found that the higher the education level the higher the marginal effect produced by education on the probability of being transferred.
In column D we report effects of socioeconomic level. Medium socioeconomic background players have higher probabilities of being transferred than low socioeconomic background players. Players of higher socioeconomic background have even higher probabilities of being transferred.
Again these results suggest that there is a bias in families of higher socioeconomic background and of better-educated players with respect to participation in the professional soccer market.
Other controls
The probability of being transferred increases with age, until the player is quared Age Age S 2β β years old. According to our estimates this happens at age twenty-eight. As before, given that the objective of the game is to score more goals than the adversary it is not surprising that players with higher average of scored goals per appearance have higher probabilities of being transferred. Somewhat more surprising is that even after controlling for goals scored, attack players are preferred over midfield and defense players.
After all the controls, players who have been selected to integrate the national team have about double probability of being transferred than player who have not been selected. With all other variables at their sample averages a player who has not represented the country in the national team has a probability of being transferred of 18%. An average player that was part of the national team in the past has probabilities of being transferred of 32%. There are at least two reasons for this result. First, international exposure may facilitate the matching between foreign clubs and national players. Second, this variable may be capturing other players' attributes that are not captured by the other regressors. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the player is transferred permanently or temporarily and 0 otherwise. Performance is the players' journalist average evaluation. Age is measured in years. Junior Divisions is a dummy that values 1 if the player was formed in the junior divisions of the team were he is currently playing. Goals is the average scored goals per appearance. Cards is the average weighted sum of red and yellow cards (1 red = 2 yellows) received to the number of appearances. Position=Defense, Position=Midfield and Position=Attack are dummies taking the value of 1 whether the player is a defense, midfield or attack player. National Team is a dummy that takes the value of 1 whether the player ever represented the country in the national team. Educ=2 and Educ=3 takes the value of 1 if the player was enrolled in the first level of high school or if he attained higher levels respectively. Race values 1 if the player is nonwhite and finally Socioec=Medium and Socioec=High take the value of 1 if the player comes from a medium or high socioeconomic environment. Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Conclusions
This paper points that investment in general human capital (schooling) even if it has no real effects on players performance induces a self-selection of players to account for the different outside opportunities they face. Better educated players and players of higher socioeconomic background have higher outside opportunities. If they decide to play soccer professionally they must be compensated for their higher outside opportunities.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical paper on sports economics to report positive significant effects of education (and socioeconomic background) on performance and the probability of being promoted. This paper also points to a second selection biased produced by racial discrimination.
We found evidence that racial discrimination within the national sports market is higher than in the labor market in general but not found evidence of racial discrimination for international transfers. Although a players' race does not affect the probability of being transferred, nonwhite players' performance is better evaluated than white players' performance. If talent is equally distributed in the population and nonwhite players are marginally better evaluated, it must be that nonwhite players find it more difficult to obtain a professional contract than white players. Thus, our evidence points towards discrimination in the passage from the junior formative phases to the professional stage in the Uruguayan soccer market.
With respect to other determinants we found that age has a nonlinear relation with the probability of being transferred. The trade off between more experience and a worsening athletic condition starts producing negative marginal returns at age twentyeight. Playing in the professional division of the team where the player was formed improves individual performance. Finally, international exposure (through the national team) and being an offensive player increase the probability of being promoted to a foreign league.
